below, supposed beneficiaries of ' .. . these unwelcome remedies may iprotest them and demand alternative policies.
Though the divergence between the modes of gender and !: ethnic representation cuts across many countries, it has received no scholarly attention. We know a great deal about women's movements and women in pol-_ itics, and a growing number of works focus on gender quotas. | Hundreds of scholars have studied ethnic identity formation and , .:.. mobilization; the causes and consequences of conflict; and institutional solutions for i. divided societies. Few works analyze representational politics across identities.2 Such a comparison is needed, however, if we are to understand why policy solutions to women's underrepresentation diverge so dramatically from those applied to ethnic groups. Comparing gender and ethnicity also reveals that claims made on these differing bases have different implications for the liberal state. Table 1 identifies countries with statutory gender quotas or reservations, ethnic quotas or reservations, or both. (For descriptions of these policies, see tables la and lb at the end of this article.)3 As table 1 shows, about 50 countries use such mechanisms, including old and new democracies; rich and poor countries; Catholic, Protestant, Islamic, Confucian, and Hindu societies; federal and unitary systems; and presidential and parliamentary regimes. Dozens of other countries without statutory measures uphold effective political arrangements to guarantee group representation, such as quotas used voluntarily by political parties in over 30 countries; the race-conscious districting practiced in the United States; and the application of lower electoral thresholds for minority political organizations in Denmark, Germany, Poland, and Romania. Notwithstanding the importance of these voluntary arrangements, this paper is concerned exclusively with statutory mechanisms. Reliable cross-national data on party statutes, their interpretation, and their enforcement were not available. This is a fertile area for future research, since additional data have the potential to change the findings reported here. 4 Policies to guarantee group representation generally assume one of two forms: candidate nomination quotas in political parties or legislative reservations. Quotas require that a minimum number of candidates fielded by political parties for general election have certain demographic characteristics. The Argentine Ley de Cupos (or Quota Law of 1991), for example, requires that women comprise a minimum of 30 percent of States adopted these policies at different historical moments. In some countries, collective representational rights constitute part of the bargain struck to ensure the viability of democracy in a plural society. In such "consociational" or "consensus" polities, each group is guaranteed a share of power to preclude secession and civil war. Other countries introduced collective rights rather recently in response to the growth of identitybased social movements and their demands for the recognition of cultural diversity. These claims have mobilized concern for the question of whether elites in power resemble, in their personal characteristics and life experiences, the people they represent, thus transforming group representation from a matter of state survival into a question of democratic legitimacy and social justice.
Group Representation Policies
Considerable debate surrounds these policies. Liberal critics argue that granting rights to identity groups treats them as essential givens, failing to acknowledge their dynamism and fluidity, as well as internal injustices suffered by some members. Existing liberal institutions, moreover, can resolve the domination and oppression inflicted on social groups since these wrongs are ultimately suffered by individuals.5 Civic republicans claim that group-differentiated rights undermine common citizenship and render suspect a public good toward which society could be oriented,6 while libertarians allege that collective rights benefit the already privileged, increase in-group inequality, and aggravate social divisions.7 Finally, (Steiner 1990; Steiner 2002 ). social scientists have found that policies promoting the descriptive representation of minorities may actually end up harming their substantive representation: for example, the creation of so-called majority-minority districts helps to put more blacks and Latinos in the U.S. House of Representatives, but it may also facilitate the election of legislators elsewhere who are ideologically hostile to their interests.8
Defenders of quotas and reservations point out that group rights do not constitute a major departure from existing democratic practices. After all, some form of collective representation is inherent to the political process. As Justice Lewis E Powell put it in a 1968 voting rights opinion, "The concept of representation necessarily applies to groups; groups of voters elect representatives; individuals do not."9 Single-member district systems define such groups by territory; other electoral regimes, such as national-list proportional representation, accommodate non-geographically based constituencies. Liberal polities such as the United States and Canada have traditionally drawn geographical district boundaries around "communities of interest," be they regional, economic, environmental, or historical; by granting an equal number of seats to states regardless of population, the U.S. and Australian Senates offer privileges to residents of smaller, potentially disadvantaged states.10 The point is that political institutions inevitably make decisions about the types of groups that gain representation. Quotas and reserved seats differ in degree, but not in kind, from the everyday work states already perform on politically-relevant social identities.
Gender Quotas and Ethnic Reservations in Electoral Democracies
When we consider only electoral democracies, the following pattern emerges: states give candidate quotas in political parties to women and reserved seats in legislatures to members of ethnic groups. As table 2 demonstrates, there are only four exceptions to this rule. The probability that a democracy with group rights for women will have candidate quotas is 0.86; in countries with measures guaranteeing ethnic representation, the probability is 0.94 that these take the form of legislative reservations.
What accounts for this divergence in modalities of gender and ethnic representation? My argument can be summarized in the following syllogism: (1) candidate quotas are more appropriate for groups that crosscut partisan cleavages, while reservations suit groups that coincide with them; (2) gender identities tend to cut across parties, whereas ethnic identities often overlap with partisan affiliations; (3) consequently, disadvantaged groups that are defined by gender demand, and are granted, candidate quotas; ethnic groups prefer, and receive, legislative reservations.
Quotas for crosscutting groups; reservations for coinciding ones To understand the different uses of the two types of policies, we must first explore the distinct means they use to improve the representation of identity groups. Quotas intervene in party nomination procedures by requiring that a certain percentage of the candidates fielded by a party be of a certain group. For example, the quota may demand that around one-third of positions on party lists be occupied by women and that they alternate with men in the rank ordering of candidates, as is the case in Argentina, Costa Rica, Belgium, and Guyana.1' A quota policy may therefore provoke some changes in the ways parties go about nominating candidates, formulating lists, and deciding who runs in what district. However, it does not alter the overall structure of incentives governing the political system. Specifically, quotas do not affect issues such as counting rules, timing, the circumscription of electoral districts, the structure of the ballot, and so on that have been shown to exert the most powerful effects on voter behavior, the party system, and internal party structure.12 Reservations take a different approach. They introduce groupspecific avenues of representation that circumvent the existing party system and create new electoral incentives. These include the creation of: separate electoral rolls, special electoral districts that limit competition to group members, exceptions to counting rules, and provisions for direct appointment to the legislature. Candidate quotas thus presume a different sort of problem from that addressed by reservations. The goal of quotas is to take a category of people who belong to, but suffer from discrimination in, mainstream parties and propel them to positions wherein they stand a chance of popular election. Quotas therefore provide a means of assimilation and integration into already existing political institutions. Reservations, by con- Figure 1 helps us see why a candidate quota would make little sense for a coinciding group.
those countries considered
What is gained by making space for group members within all parties when they tend to cluster at one end of the political spectrum? In fact, a candidate quota might undermine a minority group's political organizations as its partisan opponents snatch up group leaders in order to comply with the quota. Finally, figure 3 clarifies the mechanics of legislative reservations. They permit a group's party, organizations, or independent representatives to gain power on their own and may furnish additional incentives for formation of minority parties.
In theory, a proportional representation (PR) electoral system, particularly one with low thresholds, would facilitate the representation of group-specific parties and organizations. PR also avoids a situation in which the state is compelled to assign individuals to specific groups (as required by the maintenance of ethnic voter rolls or the reservation of certain districts for group members), a practice that contradicts the fluidity and contextual nature of many ethnic identities. In addition, PR is flexible, permitting the automatic adjustment of representational relationships to changing demographics and political interests. Divided legislatures and reserved seat ratios, by Ethnic boundaries are not always politically loaded, however, and not everyone has a communal experience of ethnicity. Its coincidence with partisan and ideological cleavages and geographic concentration is the effect of historical construction as well as political manipulation. Ethnic groups in some countries, such as Afro-descendents in Brazil, have features usually associated with gender identity, such as low geographic segregation and little correlation with voting behavior or party affiliation. Consequently, the affirmative action bill under consideration in the Brazilian Congress calls for racial quotas in parties, not for reserved seats in the legislature.27 The stacking of ethnicity on salient social divisions is the product, not the premise, of a political process, an outcome to which the allocation of specific representational rights surely contributes.
For these reasons, there is an active debate among political scientists about which types of institutions can best mold Second, most politicians regard quotas as a temporary measure. As more women gain power, they )reak down the obstacles holding others back. Over time, uota will become obsolete. nally, women's activism around quotas has been episodic. the adoption of quota laws, women's coalitions have dised as their members returned to their prior commitments )ecame reabsorbed into their parties. In some countriesbly Argentina, Costa Rica, Belgium, and Guyanaen's presence in power increased significantly as a result of uota. Yet the feminization of legislative delegations has roduced major changes in what parties actually do. Though women politicians have introduced fresh items to politigendas, their collective presence has thus far failed to uce major shifts in policy and practice.32 hnic demands for reservations have followed a quite *ent political logic. Rather than improving the legitimacy ready existing democracies, the granting of reserved has tended to occur as part of a founding compromise nsociational or consensus polities. In these countries, legislatures, the allocation of ministerial portfolios hnicity, or fixed ratios of parliamentary seats form part e elite bargains necessary to make democracy possible. group has a constitutional share of power, giving it an tive not to defect from the existing political regime and rmine the survival of the state. As opposed to quotas, h improve the leadership prospects of group members n existing parties, reservations presume the existence of p-specific parties or organizations. Groups demanding vations do not want to be integrated into mainstream es. They want access to political power in their own tions have backed the new policies. Women from the Per-In Belgium, the constitution requires that there be an equal number of French-and Dutch-speaking ministers in the federal government and in the government of the Brussels region, with the parliament divided between these two language communities and their respective party systems. In Switzerland, language group quotas are used not only in the federal council,33 but in other areas of government (such as the armed forces) and in society as a whole (such as the executive committee of the Swiss soccer association).3 Lebanon is another classic story of how ethnic reservations helped forge the state. The National Pact of 1943 reserved all major offices-the president was to be a Maronite; the prime minister a Sunni; the speaker of the house a Shiite; and so on-and fixed the ethnic composition of the parliament at a 6:5 ratio of Christians to Muslims. 35 Elsewhere, the ethnic allocation of political power was codified in peace agreements following civil wars. International mediators, with an eye toward establishing pluralist polities, helped install forms of power sharing in virtually all of the new states formed after the breakup of Yugoslavia. Bosnia and Herzegovina has a three-member presidency comprised of a Bosniak, Serb, and Croat, as well as a bicameral legislative assembly divided between these three communities. In Serbia and Montenegro, the bicameral federal legislature is divided between Serbians and Montenegrans. In Kosovo, seats are reserved in parliament for Serbs, Roma, and other ethnic groups. (In less polarized Croatia and Slovenia, a smaller number of seats are reserved for minorities.)36 Other countries inherited powersharing from former colonial rulers. In Fiji, the ethnic reservation of parliamentary seats dates from colonial times, when the British authorities sought to separate indigenous Fijians from Indo-Fijians and install themselves as mediators. After the country's independence, the vast majority of parliamentary seats continued to be reserved by ethnicity.37 Some reservations policies reflect attempts to compensate victims of slavery, colonialism, or a caste system for past oppression. India's reservations for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are intended to ameliorate the historic discrimination suffered by those at the lowest rungs of the caste system. New Zealand's white rulers made a similar attempt to compensate oppressed minorities: the Maori Representation Act of 1867 installed four representatives in a legislature of over 70 members. The number of seats later increased to seven (representatives are elected by voters who voluntarily register for a separate Maori roll).38
In the late twentieth century, some disadvantaged ethnic groups demanded rights during constitutional reforms. Responding to indigenous mobilization, the Colombian Constitution (1991) created a two-seat senatorial district for Indians and permitted the reservation of up to five seats in the lower house for ethnic groups and other political minorities. Venezuela had a similar experience: the 1999 constitutional reform established three reserved seats for "indigenous communities" in the national assembly and permitted social movement organizations to contest them, thus eliminating the party registration barrier. In both countries, these seats granted Advocates of women's representation thus had to make a case that their preferred policies were compatible with republican universalism. This required demonstrating that the existing model was flawed for failing to incorporate sex differences and that gender parity would not legitimize representational rights for other social groups. Gender, they argued, is a unique form of social difference.
Unlike ethnicity, race, and religion, which are socially constructed and changeable categories, sex is universal and permanent:
Women do not constitute a category analogous to minorities, but half of humanity, and their status is immutable. The young grow older, one can change one's religion, people of color can intermix with others-miscegenation is widespread-, workers may switch professions, and so on. But once one is born a man or woman, one does not change (save in the extremely rare case of transsexuals).41 Both traditional French "universalism," which stresses the unity of men and women, and contemporary American "particularism," which collapses sex into other forms of difference, are therefore misguided. Philosopher Sylvia Agacinski, wife of former Socialist Premier Lionel Jospin, argues that both political traditions have denied the real nature of sex:
The "French" effacement proceeds by engulfing both sexes in an abstract humanism, from which only the singular model of a sexually neutral human being can surface.... The "American" effacement proceeds by drowning women in a systematic particularism in which minorities of all sorts (ethnic, religious, cultural, etc.) are grouped together, and both sexes end up being considered pure "constructions." ... Today, the new French feminism simultaneously challenges both these types of sexual neutralization in affirming sexual duality as the only universal difference within humanity. This is why it was able to conceive of the parite ideal in politics.42
The fact of sexual difference divides humanity in two. As a result, a republican polity that claims to include all citizens, but in which only men hold power, unjustly privileges one half over the other. Parity feminists did not want their arguments to be leveled against a legislature of white Catholics, however. Since sex is the only universal category, women are not like any other social group.
With this stance, parity advocates were able to anchor their movement within republican discourse and find allies from the mainstream of French politics. By denying that parity would or should lead to a cascade of demands for other representational rights, they made their case more palatable. What is more, they focused on the narrow objective of getting the parity bill passed, and not broader considerations, such as socioeconomic equality and policy change. By avoiding questions about the substantive representation of women's interests, French feminists of diverse political and ideological stripes were able to smooth over their differences and unite in a nonpartisan movement. This also helped defray fears that right-wing and conservative women would be attacked or disqualified, and by the mid-1990s, most politicians had jumped on the parity bandwagon. When it came to a vote in the national assembly, the parity proposals-both the constitutional amendment and the implementing legislation-were approved unanimously. Following promulgation of the law, however, the large and diverse movement began to disperse. What had held participants together was support for parity, not a more comprehensive policy agenda or a shared history of activism.43
The parity law worked well in the 2001 municipal elections, since municipal councilors are elected under a semiproportional closed-list system and parties were required to include three women for every three men on the list. In cities of more than 3,500 inhabitants where the parity law was applied, women's presence on municipal councils rose to 48 percent. Yet at the national level, where deputies are elected by the first-past-the-post system in single-member districts, the results were disappointing. Preferring to suffer financial penalties rather than comply with the quota, the center Right UMP nominated women to less than 20 percent of the districts where it ran a candidate, and even the Socialist Party nominated women to only 36 percent of districts. Most of these were losing districts and the number of women in the assembly barely increased (from 62 to 71 out of 576, or to 12 percent of the total).44 The constitution promulgated in 1950 rejected communal quotas as an organizing principle in favor of formal equality and individual rights, with two exceptions. Recognizing that equal treatment would be insufficient to ameliorate historic discrimination suffered by the lowest social groups, the constitution upheld the British legacy of legislative reservations for untouchables (Scheduled Castes) and introduced them for indigenous groups (Scheduled Tribes). Similar consideration, however, was not extended to Muslims or women. Delimitation commissions in each state designated single-member constituencies in which only members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes could stand for office, even though the electorate as a whole would vote for them (the number was proportional to their share of the population). The text authorized a range of other policies to advance "backward classes" of citizens, including: reserved posts in government service and university admissions; scholarships, meals, supplies, and special schools; and preference for economic development assistance.46
Reservations policy in India
The debate over women's representation died down for several decades, but it was revived in the 1970s when the government of India formed the Committee on the Status of Women to propose recommendations for improving their rights and opportunities. Its report was to be launched in time for International Women's Year in 1975. One of the thorniest issues considered by the committee was gender reservations. After weighing arguments for and against, it declined to recommend such policies at the national or state level, though it Articles I| s Gender like Ethnicity? The Political Representation of Identity Groups recognized women's political underrepresentation as a serious problem.
To justify its position, the committee drew a distinction between women, who are a "category," and minority "communities," including those based on caste and religion. "There can be no rational basis for reservations for women," since "the minority argument cannot be applied to women. Women are not a community, they are a category. Though they have some real problems of their own, they share with men the problems of their groups, locality and community. Women are not concentrated in certain areas [or] confined to particular fields of activity."47 "Women's interests as such," the committee wrote, "cannot be isolated from the economic, social, and political interests of groups, strata and classes in the society."48 Anticipating arguments made by French feminists in the 1990s, Indian experts stressed the difference between women and ethnic minority communities, but as an argument against women's representation, not in favor of it. The Committee on the Status of Women did, however, borrow the institutional model the state had used for Scheduled Castes and Tribes and endorsed reserved seats for women in local governments. This appears to have been a compromise between those who rejected women's representation altogether and those who wanted to recommend reservations at all levels.49 Indeed, many features of the official report are contradictory, seemingly reflecting the amount of dissent over the issue. For example, though it declares that "the minority argument cannot be applied to women," the report also states that "though women do not numerically constitute a minority, they are beginning to acquire features of a minority community" because of continued gender inequalities in class, status, and power.50 The local-level recommendations were adopted in 1992 as the 73rd and 74th amendments to the Indian Constitution, reserving for women one-third of the seats at the three tiers of the Panchayati Raj institutions of rural self-governance, as well as in elected urban councils.51
The debate was revived in 1996 when MP and former Minister for Women Margaret Alva proposed to amend the constitution to extend the women's reservations system to the national and state legislatures. A lottery system would determine the single-member districts in which only women could run, and these would rotate every two elections. The bill would also reserve one-third of the seats allocated to Scheduled Castes and Tribes for women of those communities. Though virtually every political party supported the bill in their 1996 electoral platforms, the parliamentary debates over it were ferocious, with some MPs almost coming to blows and others rushing to the podium to tear up copies of the text.52
One of the main parliamentary concerns was the relationship between women's reservations and rights for members of "other backward classes" (OBCs, a group the 1950 constitution had recognized as entitled to special protections). In a 1990 decision that provoked massive controversy, the government had granted OBCs reservations in its central bureaucracy, but not in national and state legislatures. Entrepreneurial MPs from the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) demanded that the women's bill include subreservations for lower castes, a move that allowed them to appear as champions of the OBCs, but which mired the gender proposal in polemics surrounding caste rights. In addition, some legislators called for special provisions in the bill for Muslims. As Laura Dudley Jenkins notes, "by endorsing the bill in party platforms and then failing to pass it out of a sudden concern for backward citizens or Muslims, politicians court the women's vote, the backwards vote, and the Muslim vote and simultaneously protect their own hopes of reelection."53 Popular views of the elitist nature of the women's movement also did not help the cause of the bill. Middle-class women had assumed visible roles in protests against the decision to grant OBCs central government reservations and most feminist organizations had failed to build ties to lower caste groups.
During the debate, a prominent OBC politician declared that the reservation bill was for "balkati auraten" or short-haired women, a reference to upper class urban feminists.54 The comment tapped an underlying fear that, without subreservations, the women's bill would end up benefiting only high-caste Hindus.
As in France, political actors in India highlighted the crosscutting nature of gender. Unlike ethnic groups, women transcend geographic, occupational, language, and religious categories. In France, this meant that, in theory, women's representation would not threaten the republican universalist tradition. In India, by contrast, women's crosscutting status made it less likely that they would represent the caste and socioeconomic interests the reservations system was supposed to advance. Meanwhile, a group of dissidents argued that rather than reserved seats, the bill should introduce a candidate quota within political parties. The Forum for Democratic Reforms argued that the reservations proposal was seriously and inherently flawed. By mechanically providing for the entrance of women into one-third of the seats in the national and state legislatures, the bill failed to address the main problem impeding women's effective participation in politics: gender discrimination in political parties.55 These activists viewed as disingenuous those Indian politicians who endorsed the bill while doing nothing for women within their respective parties:
The very same male party leaders who compete with each other in announcing their support of special reservations for women have shown little willingness to include women in party decision making, or even to help create a conducive atmosphere for women's participation in their own organizations. In fact, women's marginalization is even more pronounced in the day-to-day functioning of almost all political parties than in the Lok Sabha. Therefore, it is urgently required that we make special measures to enhance women's political participation in ways that will help them influence decision making at all levels of our society and polity. Our democracy will remain seriously flawed if it fails to yield adequate space to women.56 Furthermore, the Forum argued, a system of women's reservations would enable patriarchal leaders to solidify their positions. At the local level, political bosses regularly compel their wives, sisters, and daughters to contest reserved seats. National politicians would duplicate this strategy and the women entering politics would be mere fronts for male power.57
Pointing out that those countries with the highest levels of women's representation use candidate quotas, not reserved seats, these critics proposed an alternative bill. It would require that one-third of candidates nominated by political parties for general elections be women, though each party would be free to choose the constituencies where these women would run. Rather than contesting women's seats, female candidates would compete against men and other women in general elections. To ensure their success, parties would need to nurture these candidates. Women might therefore become legitimate leaders and have a greater political base from which to advance women's interests in parliament.58 The Indian government has not resolved these issues, so it is not yet clear whether quotas or reservations will emerge as the preferred remedy. Although the proposal initially met with overwhelming skepticism from other legislators, it eventually received a boost from an unexpected ally: the President. Alberto Fujimori, the only head of state to have attended the 1995 conference, declared his support for quotas and the majority in Congress immediately fell in line. As in France, the proposal was approved unanimously.59 Its effects on women's presence in power, however, were more dramatic: in the first national election held after the quota, the percentage of congressional seats held by women jumped from 11 to 20 percent.
Quotas in Peru
Meanwhile, the 1990s witnessed the growing ethnic politicization of indigenous peoples in various Andean countries, including Peru. Previously, a "peasant" or "poor" consciousness had tended to prevail over an indigenous one, and ethnic prejudice was perceived-and disguised-as class discrimination. The decreasing viability of class affiliations like peasant in the neoliberal era, combined with opportunities offered by global discourses of multiculturalism, helped spawn mobilization along ethnic lines.60 In 1998, organizations from the Amazon and highland regions formed the Permanent Conference of Peruvian Indigenous Peoples, uniting previously disparate organizations to forge a common political platform and lobby congress to recognize Indian rights.61
After the 2001 election of President Alejandro Toledo, the state became increasingly receptive to indigenous claims. Though he frequently donned a poncho and espoused a populist discourse, former President Fujimori had undermined indigenous land rights, and his efforts to centralize power-he canceled regional elections-reduced Indian opportunities to participate in politics. Toledo pledged to expand the rights of indigenous peoples and created a high-level commission presided over by his wife, Belgian anthropologist Elaine Karp, to represent their interests in the state. Fulfilling a campaign promise, he also reinstated regional elections.62
The law regulating these elections, approved by Congress in early 2002, declared that lists of candidates for regional and local councils comprise no less than 30 percent women and a minimum of 15 percent of representatives of "native communities" or "original peoples" in those regions where they lived. According to the national election tribunal, the indigenous quota would be applied in 11 (ofa total of 25) regions. The Peruvian case helps show how legislative reservations advance group rights and reinforce differences in a way that candidate quotas do not. Quotas attack the discrimination suffered by individuals within parties to give them a better chance of getting elected. A regime of reserved seats more directly empowers the whole group. When legislators are chosen from separate electorates and specially created districts, the policy confers on group members the right to be represented not just by one of their kind, but by a candidate of their choice. This mechanism strengthens the links between representatives and their ethnic kin constituents while distancing them from others. Reservations thus bestow a distinctive status on the group as a political community. Quotas, by contrast, collapse the group into the rest of political society.
Authoritarian Exceptions
The stories of France, India, and Peru illuminate another aspect of quotas and reservations. Their purpose is not merely to insert differently configured, colored, or cultured bodies into legislatures. Rather, advocates of these measures aim to promote the substantive representation of the interests of a disadvantaged or excluded group. The agents of such representation should therefore exercise not just symbolic but effective power. Part of the motive for choosing the right remedy is to reinforce connections between leaders and the base that nourishes them politically. Quotas improve the position of women within those parties that get them elected and advance their agendas; reservations strengthen those groups whose very existence is crucial for the promotion of the rights and interests of their members.
Regimes that lack a commitment to substantive representation have little incentive to promote the right remedy. In states with military governments, one-party states, no-party states, and other countries that fail to respect civil liberties, legislative powers are subject to arbitrary dictatorial will. Such polities lack competitive party politics and the links of accountability that they provide. Consequently, representation patterns in authoritarian polities differ from those observed in democracies. Women get reserved seats in legislatures, not candidate quotas (see table 3), as do ethnic groups. Toleration of democratic parties-which the quota remedy presumes-would undermine the survival of these regimes.
We could also speculate that in extremely oppressive societies-which correlate, albeit imperfectly, to those without democratic governance-gender is not crosscutting enough for candidate quotas. With their roles limited exclusively to biological functions, women have not spread out into the economy, society, and party system in ways characteristic of wealthy democratic states. Their common experiences and interests cause them to resemble a coinciding group more than a crosscutting category. This suggests there may be an inverse relationship between the collective identity of women and their degree of liberation: the greater the success of the feminist movement in pushing women in to the public sphere, the less they have in common.
In any event, the introduction of women's reservations in some nondemocracies shows that even these states are not immune to arguments connecting regime legitimacy with gender diversity. In Morocco, parties decided to reserve the 30-seat national list for women after a three-year process of mobilization and consultation in which international organizationsparticularly the United Nations Development Fund for Women ( Granting reserved seats to women allows nondemocracies to respond to popular pressure and conform to international norms without ceding ground to the competitive party politics presumed by candidate quotas. Yet the very nature of such regimes prevents female-and male-legislators from representing citizen interests and wielding effective power.
Conclusion
Advocates and critics of group representation frequently fail to distinguish between types of policies and the groups they apply to. Yet these distinctions are consequential for normative debates about social difference in a liberal polity. Gender-and ethnicbased demands present unique challenges to the liberal tradition. Because they are self canceling, quotas produce the opposite effect on group difference than the self-reinforcing remedy of reservations.
As a first cut at disaggregating group claims to representation, I suggest that gender quotas be seen as analogous to a class action and ethnic reservations as a group right.72 A class action is a legal suit initiated by some plaintiffs on behalf of a larger collective of people in order to vindicate a particular set of rights. The class is constituted by virtue of having suffered a similar wrong. The objective of the suit is to identify this wrong and put the plaintiffs in a position to recover for the individual harms they have suffered. That is, a class action aims at the erasure of an externally imposed disability. A class action is self-canceling: achievement of the claim extinguishes the legal identity of the class.
The logic of a class action corresponds closely to that of women's mobilization for gender quotas. They unite to contest common experiences of political exclusion and discrimination. The quota remedy aims to transcend these gender-based disabilities, thereby erasing the conditions giving rise to the claim in the first place. Once women enter political office, the reasons motivating the quota movement disappear. The logic of the quota is "to put the group out of business as a group."73 As the French case shows, women from all parties and ideologies united in the struggle for quotas, but reverted to their prior ideological and political commitments once this goal was achieved. This trajectory parallels the cyclical patterns observed in women's movements more generally: they emerge to oppose problems (denial of voting rights, military rule, discriminatory legislation) but dissipate once the situation has been resolved. Women may act like a group in order to get something, but realign themselves as a category once they have it. Being excluded from power makes women conscious of belonging to a group; once they have power, this group identity tends to weaken and dissipate.74
Ethnic reservations, by contrast, are a group right. Claimed in order to guarantee the continued existence of the group, they are exercised collectively by group members. Such rights are selfreinforcing rather than self-canceling. Organizations of Chinese in Mauritius, Croats in Bosnia, and Italian-speakers in Switzerland will not dissipate once representational rights have been granted. On the contrary, since legislative reservations create incentives for the development of group-specific organizations, their boundaries will be strengthened.
Self-canceling claims for political inclusion have the reverse effect of self-reinforcing group rights. Women seeking quotas aim to have their different position absorbed by universalistic institutions. Ethnic minorities demanding reservations want their particularism recognized and legitimized. These are opposite trajectories: women suffer from too much difference; ethnic groups, from too little. Claims for inclusion pose less of a challenge to contemporary liberal institutions than claims to difference.75
The distinction between a class action and a group right is an analytical one I inferred from this study of representation policies in contemporary democracies. It does not describe all claims made on behalf of gender and ethnic identities. In fact, gender claims may on occasion be self-reinforcing: some women's movements aim at separatism; others argue that their essential differences from men require dissimilar treatment over the long term. And ethnic claims may sometimes be selfcanceling: part of the rationale behind reservations in India is to help break down caste distinctions; likewise, affirmative action in the United States and Brazil seeks to make race less determining for political opportunities, occupational status, and social experience.
Nevertheless, selecting one remedy for underrepresentation over others will generally shape the future trajectory of a social group. A candidate quota promotes the integration of group members into existing political parties. Beneficiaries of the quota may later act to advance group interests, but they will do so-save at episodic moments-as individuals, not as a group. A legislative reservation produces the opposite effect: it strengthens ties among group members by connecting them through channels of representation distinct from those used for everyone else. Though more conducive to continued collective action, reservations have the potential to magnify intergroup differences and impede development of the overlapping affiliations that underlie a successful democracy. The choice between softening or hardening difference inevitably arises in the quest for political justice. Policymakers designing institutions and the scholars advising them should take notice lest they unwittingly trade a legislature of white men for a fragmented, even polarized political society. 
